The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls in rapid waves,
Now dark -- now glittering -- now reflecting gloom --
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs
The source of human thought its tributes brings
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The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!
P. B. Shelley, Mont Blanc
I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in
the science of human nature, that when any impression
becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to
such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates
to them a share of its force and vivacity.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
Jerry Fodor has recently suggested (Hume Variations, Oxford University Press, 2003) that Hume’s minimalist set of metaphysical assumptions about the causal machinery behind the processes we observe in cognition make him a useful philosopher to consider to see the basic value of a Representational Theory of Mind versus a Pragmatic theory, of seeing concepts as objects of mental contemplation, rather than as dispositions to act and classify objects. Looking a bit more closely at the role that force and vivacity play in Hume’s theory of abstract ideas reveals, however, that Hume may not be the ideal philosopher to make this case. The real content of thought for Hume lies in the customs and habits associated with ideas, and is felt through the force and vivacity associated with them.
I. Hume on the Content of Ideas:
A. Hume on Ideas, Impressions, and Beliefs.
1. Ideas are paler copies of sense impressions differing only from them in their degree of force and vivacity. Ideas of memory and imagination, likewise, differ only in their vivacity. Quotes 1, 2, 6.
2. Belief is a habit associated with an idea. This habit is manifested in the force and vivacity with which the idea is held. Quotes 3, 6, 8.
B. Hume on general, abstract, ideas:
1. All ideas are particular and determinate. Ideas became general by bringing to mind an indefinite number of other ideas according to a custom of habit associated with the word or idea.
2. The meaning of a general idea, then, is the custom or habit by which it comes indifferently to bring to mind a wide range of associated ideas.
3. This custom and the impetus associated with a general idea are mysterious things to be known by analogy to other cases: Quote 4.
a. Ideas of large numbers, such as 1000, do not have a clear and determinate image.
b. An entire verse of poetry, though we can't recall it at the moment, can be brought back to us in a moment by one word.
c. We have no clear image for our complex ideas, such as church, negotiation, or conquest.
d. Knowing an idea bestows a marvelous ability to bring up relevant ideas at appropriate times without having a clear idea how we do so. Quote 5.
C. Summary of Hume's insights:
1. Apart from the representational content of an idea there is another component: its force and vivacity, its impetus.
2. The impetus of ideas is felt, part of the phenomenology of the idea, though it is distinct from the content of the idea and is not itself another idea. (Indeed, it would have been more consistent for Hume to consider emotions and sentiments as these types of impetüs than as separate ideas.)
3. The impetus of ideas, as the name suggests, is active, is connected with habit or custom, and directs the production and flow of ideas. Quote 8
4. The meaning of general ideas is a custom, the un-represented meaning of an idea is its impetus, which is distinct from its definition, or list of instances, or explicit rules for producing these instances.
II. The Content of Ideas
A. The Content is in the Connections: Once one sees the way ideas actually do their work for Hume, it becomes clear that they are merely tokens, along for the ride in the real business of the transmission of the force or impetus that thought involves. A consideration of Hume’s view of abstract ideas suggests that the real content of thought lies within the impetus, not the idea.
B. The Habits and Dispositions (impetus) that form the real content of ideas is felt as the form of ideas and originates in the object: A vague complex of feelings and associations that precedes guides and impels the concrete expressions of the idea. These are the impetüs referred to in Hume's four examples. These are the felt forces, habits ,and dispositions that are always necessary to explain how representation really works: to explain how general representation works and to explain the nature of form in the mind. We have a vague feeling of the intent of our actions and our expressions before we perform them, and this vague feeling impels and guides our activity of expression
C. While the content of representations as re-presented is not caused by the object, the impetus is so caused. An impetus is formal. It is the form of the felt force of the connection between different modes of interaction with the world. Such forms are capable of being, and in fact are, transmitted through the causal operations of the sense organs and nervous system. These forms, which flow to us from their secret source within things are then channeled and re-transmitted in the many stages of re-presentation that lead to conscious perception. The imagination is precisely the faculty of performing the connections of past and present forms that transmits (and in the free operation of the imagination, creates) this impetus, the impetus of our ideas. Hence, the everlasting universe of things is indeed flowing through us with the transmission and channeling of an impetus. And since an impetus originates in an impression and transmits the form of the object, the secret strength of things, which governs thought, and to the infinite dome of heaven is as a law, does indeed inhabit thee.
Quotes from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature
On the Content of Ideas
All quotes from Book I, Part I.
From SECT. 1.
Quote 1: Impressions and Ideas.
ALL the perceptions of the human mind resolve
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call
IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists
in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they
strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or
consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most
force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this
name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions,
as they make their first appearance in the soul.
Quote 2: Impressions and ideas differ not in content but only in impetus
The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is
the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in
every other particular, except their degree of force and
vivacity.
From SECT. V.-Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory.
Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which
always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the
vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this
alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is
in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses,
or a repetition of that impression in the memory.
'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception,
which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays
the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon it,
when we trace the relation of cause and effect.
From SECT. VII. Of Abstract Ideas.
Quote 4: Meaning of general idea a custom
A particular idea becomes general by being
annex'd to a general term; that is, to a term, which from a
customary conjunction has a relation to many other
particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the
imagination.
The only difficulty, that can remain on this subject,
must be with regard to that custom, which so readily
recalls every particular idea, for which we may have
occasion, and is excited by any word or sound, to which we
commonly annex it. The most proper method, in my opinion,
of giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the
mind, is by producing other instances, which are analogous
to it, and other principles, which facilitate its
operation. To explain the ultimate causes of our mental
actions is impossible. 'Tis sufficient, if we can give any
satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy.
Quote 5: Custom or impetus a mysterious power of the soul
The fancy runs from one end of
the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which
belong to any subject. One would think the whole
intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our
view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most
proper for our purpose. There may not, however, be any
present, beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by
a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho' it be
always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is
properly what we call a genius, is however inexplicable by
the utmost efforts of human understanding.
From SECT. VII.-OF the Nature of the Idea or Belief.
Quote 6: Impetus does not change content. Belief an impetus
All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz.
impressions and ideas, which differ from each other only in
their different degrees of force and vivacity.' Our ideas
are copy'd from our impressions, and represent them in all
their parts. When you would any way vary the idea of a
particular object, you can only increase or diminish its
force and vivacity. If you make any other change on it, it
represents a different object or impression. The case is the
same as in colours. A particular shade of any colour may
acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any
other variation. But when you produce any other variation,
'tis no longer the same shade or colour. So that as belief
does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any
object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force
and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be
most, accurately defined, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR
ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION.
Quote 7: Impetus something felt but mysterious.
An idea assented to <feels> different
from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us:
And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling
it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or
<firmness>, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may
seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that
act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us
than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and
gives them a superior influence on the passions and
imagination.
...........................
I confess, that 'tis impossible to
explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We
may make use of words, that express something near it. But
its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that
every one sufficiently understands in common life.
From SECT. VIII.-OF the Causes of Belief.
Quote 8: Impetus transmitted from idea to idea, originates in object.
I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in
the science of human nature, that when any impression
becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to
such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates
to them a share of its force and vivacity.
Now 'tis evident the
continuance of the disposition depends entirely on the
objects, about which the mind is employ'd; and that any new
object naturally gives a new direction to the spirits, and
changes the disposition; as on the contrary, when the mind
fixes constantly on the same object, or passes easily and
insensibly along related objects, the disposition has a much
longer duration.