CHAPTER III

THE CASE AGAINST the Representational Model of Epistemology

I will attempt to respond to two different critiques of the role of representations in knowledge in this dissertation. The first of these, given by Richard Rorty, is taken on in this chapter. It argues that the failure of the traditional model of knowledge implies the failure of the Representational Model of Epistemology as well. The second of these, by Hilary Putnam, is considered in detail in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine. It retains the traditional model of representation, but attempts to make it work by making the objects it represents internal to the representational system. It seems to me that Rorty's is the more powerful critique, since if there is no alternative to the physical-visual model of representation then the Representational Model of Epistemology must indeed be rejected. The physical-visual model of representation, as we shall see in Chapter Nine, does not work even if objects themselves are made representations within our scheme. While Rorty's may be the more powerful critique, it is much easier to respond to. Rorty's argument is simply that the traditional model of representation doesn't work. If an alternative model of representation that does work can be found then the Representational Model of Epistemology can be salvaged. I attempt to provide such a model in Part Two. Before we look at that alternative model, let us examine Rorty's critique of the Representational Model of Epistemology.

Rorty argues that the failure of the traditional model of representation has some important consequences. He argues that it implies not just that we need a new theory of truth, or a new theory of knowledge, but that truth and knowledge are not things that we need theories about. Rorty characterizes his "pragmatic" view in this way:

This theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of the property which all true statements share. ... Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common feature.

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When they suggest that we not ask questions about the nature of Truth or Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that "there is no such thing" as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a "relativistic" or "subjectivist" theory of Truth or Goodness. They would simply like to change the subject. (Rorty 1983, pp. xiii-xiv)

Rorty sees that the traditional model runs into trouble when it attempts to distinguish between knowledge and opinion, when it attempts to explain justification. Rorty takes this as showing that this distinction should be done away with. (Rorty 1983, p. xvi)

Rorty's argument is quite simple. His argument is a straight-forward version of the perspectivist fallacy. He assumes, correctly, that on the traditional model representations cannot determine their own relation to the world. He then goes on to argue that the attempts in the history of modern philosophy to provide foundations for our knowledge by providing a theory of representation or a theory of knowledge that ascertains the connection between our representations and the world all must fail, because any such theory is itself a representation. We cannot escape the representational systems and the perspectives from which we always contact the world, so there is no way for us to ascertain the correspondence of our representations to the world beyond our system of represent`tions.

Rorty says this of the attempt to inquire into the adequacy of language:

The latter suggestion presupposes that there is some way of breaking out of language in order to compare it with something else. But there is no way to think about either the world or our purposes except by using our language. One can use language to criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end. ... Philosophy, the attempt to say "how language relates to the world" by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, impossible.

It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins - the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism - and compare ourselves with something absolute. (Rorty 1983, p. xix)

Rorty objects to the attempt to use an empirical theory of the relation between representations and the world as a foundation that will guarantee the correspondence of our representations to the world. He says:

... the issue is not adequacy of explanation of fact, but whether a practice of justification can be given a "grounding" in fact. The question is not whether human knowledge in fact has "foundations," but whether it makes sense to suggest that it does - whether the idea of epistemic or moral authority having a "ground" in nature is a coherent one. (Rorty 1979, p. 178)

Rorty answers this question in the negative: "... nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and ... there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence." (Rorty 1979, p. 178)

Rorty argues that the attempt by Locke and others to provide a foundation for our knowledge through giving a theory of representation was a confusion of justification and explanation. (Rorty 1979, pp. 140-141) An explanation of the causal origin of our representations is itself a representation. It can no more determine the relation between another set of representations and their object than it can determine its relation to its own noumenal object. We only experience representations, so justification by providing an account of how our representations connect up with a world beyond our representations does not make sense. Justification is a practice within our representational systems.

To attempt to provide a foundation for our knowledge by providing another theory, which explains the relation of our knowledge to the world, is to confuse explanation with justification, a practice that goes on within our conceptual systems. It is to fail to see that, because of the failure of the physical-visual model of representation, knowledge can no longer be viewed as a relation between representations and the world; knowledge is a relationship between persons and propositions, not representations and an external world. (Rorty 1979, pp. 141-142)

This argument of Rorty's is a weak[1] version of the perspectivist fallacy. It argues only that it is impossible to have objective knowledge of objects outside of a perspective or representational system from within that system or perspective. Becoming self-conscious about the perspective we are in by providing a theory of representation will not allow us to avoid the distorting influences of our perspective and gain knowledge of objects outside the system, because this theory is itself a representation within the system. It provides no more access to external objects than does the original system for which it was to provide foundations. The Representational Model of Epistemology fails because it is impossible to provide a theory of representation which is not itself a representation. (The similarity to Berkeley's argument here is not accidental.)

But, as we saw, the perspectivist fallacy has no force apart from the physical-visual model of representation, the very model of representation that Rorty attacks. Only if one thinks that objects are static entities will one think that it is impossible for a representation to determine its own relation to reality from within a particular perspective. Rorty's argument depends on the very model of representation that he attacks. If representation is seen as an act in which we contact the world, particular perspectives and representations become a bridge to the external world, not a barrier that keeps us from it. In Part II we see how an alternative model of representation of this type avoids the perspectivist fallacy.