CHAPTER VII

HEGEL'S INSIGHT AND FOUR PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

In this chapter I consider four closely related problems in the philosophy of language along with an argument of Hegel's. This argument of Hegel's pinpoints the cause of the problems from the philosophy of language and points the way to their solution. Hegel's argument and all of the problems deal with the inability of representations to connect themselves to the world determinately when they are taken as static entities that must represent through their intrinsic similarity to their objects.

What Hegel's arguments show so nicely is how the problems that arise concerning the determinate reference of representations stem from an incoherence within the physical-visual model of representation itself. Hegel also shows how this model, when faced with these difficulties, leads of itself to an alternative in which representation is viewed as an interaction with an object in which we see various properties as springing from the object as their common causal locus. The recognition that the physical-visual model of representation, of itself, leads to this type of model of representation is what I call Hegel's insight. It should not be too surprising if one considers that this model takes physical representation as a paradigm for representation but then goes on to give an incomplete analysis of that paradigm. There will be a tension within the model between the paradigm and the analysis that will lead to problems and finally to a revision of the model to make the analysis consistent with what actually goes on in the paradigm cases of representation.

This is what goes on in the dialectic of Hegel's arguments. The problems in the philosophy of language can be viewed as part of a similar dialectic leading to a view similar to the one presented here. They lead one to a view in which language, by itself, is not seen as representing the world. Language, through connections solidified by nature and convention, simply activates certain concepts which then get us to represent the world ourselves in certain ways. Thus, it is not surprising that language is indeterminate in its representation; language itself does not represent the world at all. It activates concepts which can be applied in various determinate acts of representing, depending on the context of the application.

The next section contains an exegesis of the opening arguments of the Phenomenology in Hegel's own terminology. Those who find Hegel to be for the most part unintelligible (and I must admit that I fall into this class) can safely skip to the next section where I give a summary of the argument in modern terms borrowed from Charles Taylor. For those willing to brave the Hegelianisms, however, it is worthwhile to go through in detail the dialectic in which the physical-visual model of representation develops itself into a view very much like the one presented here.[1]

7.1: The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology

Hegel, in the two chapters I will consider in this section, and throughout the Phenomenology, employs a unique methods of critiquing the various positions he considers. Instead of using outside standards and principles contrary to the position considered, the criticism comes from within the point of view being criticized. The view itself upon reflection finds itself to be unsatisfactory or contradictory. As Hegel makes clear in the introduction,(Hegel 1967, p. 140) Consciousness operates according to a model or criterion of knowing. It can test this model within itself by checking to see if what it is actually doing in knowing fits the model under which it is working. In this way, Hegel will show that assumptions that are internal to the physical-visual model of representation will themselves imply its failure.

In the first chapter of the Phenomenology, "Sense Certainty", Hegel examines a stage of consciousness in which the model of knowledge in operation is one in which knowledge is immediate apprehension of the object through sensation. In this type of knowledge the object is apprehended in its totality, unaltered, and free from any conceptualization. ( Hegel 1967, p. 149) While this type of knowledge seems at first to be the richest, most concrete form of knowledge, it is in fact the poorest and most abstract type says Hegel. This type of certainty says of its object only that it is; it contains only the being of the object but nothing about it. (Hegel 1967, p. 149)

There are two elements to this certainty. There is the object of which we are certain and the I, or the representation we have of the object through which we know it. The essential element in this duality is the object. It is in virtue of the object that our representation is knowledge.(Hegel 1967, p. 150) The object is the same whether or not it is known; it is independent of the I or the representation of it. This is a central tenet of the Representational Model of Epistemology when it uses the PVMR as its model of representation._

These elements in sense certainty are not simply observations by Hegel; they are found in sense certainty itself. They are part of the model of knowing which sense certainty has within itself. What Hegel does next is to see if in fact this is the model that is actually followed in sense certainty. Sense certainty is made to criticize itself from within by considering whether its knowledge actually fits the model that it uses.(Hegel 1967, pp. 150-151)

The object in sense certainty is known merely as pure being; it is pure This. Since the knowledge is unmediated and unconceptualized, it can be indicated only by the demonstrative. What self-critical sense certainty must ask itself is what this pure demonstrative, or pure This, is.(Hegel 1967, p. 151) The This is equivalent to the here and now, so this question takes the form, "What is the Here and what is the Now?" Any statement answering this question, for example "The Here and Now is Carbondale at night.", will lose its truth in other places and times. Truth or knowledge however must be able to be said or written down. Knowledge, properly so called, must be able to be expressed linguistically without any loss, according to the model.(Hegel 1967, p. 151) The knowledge of sense certainty, even the knowledge of the pure This, cannot be immediate; the immediate cannot be said. Even the This is a universal. Sense certainty cannot say what it means to be the object of knowledge; what it means is the particular, what it says is the universal.(Hegel 1967, pp. 151-152) In examining itself, sense certainty found itself to differ from the model it had of itself. Its representation could not determinately refer to a particular object in the way the model required. The essential element, the object, was found to be universal, not immediate. Sense certainty changes its model to accord with its findings.

Sense certainty now takes the I or the representation as the essential element. Sense certainty is not done away with; the force of its truth, however, moves from the object to the immediacy of my experience.(Hegel 1967, pp. 153-154) The I, however, is found to be a universal just as the Here and the Now were. When the immediate fact of the I is put into linguistic form, a form knowledge must be able to take, it loses immediacy just as the This did. (Hegel 1967, p. 154) Here Hegel shows that even indexical representations, when seen on the physical visual model, cannot determine their own reference.

Sense certainty in examining itself, finds that the model it had of knowledge was faulty. It finds that the essential element is neither the object nor the representation. Unmediated knowledge of particulars is found to be impossible. Sense certainty in trying to know in this way finds itself in self-contradiction. It finds, instead of the unmediated particular, a universal in which particular properties and descriptions, the intended Here's and Now's, are unified.(Hegel 1967, pp. 157,160) With this, sense certainty moves to the next stage, perception.

The argument in the second chapter, "Perception", has two main stages. In the first it is argued that the object of perception as a unified thing with distinct properties is self-contradictory and that the object cannot be seen as merely a particular thing with properties nor as merely properties in a universal medium. In the second stage, it is argued that the object of perception is essentially reflected into self. But before we can examine these arguments, we need to examine the model of knowledge which perceptual consciousness is operating on.

In perception, again, we have a representation, here called the perceiving, and an object. The object, again, is seen as essential and indifferent to whether it is known or not. The representation can be as well as not be and the object would remain the same. (Hegel 1967, p. 163) We now have to look more closely at this object to see how this model of knowledge works.

The object is seen as a thing with many properties on this model. The object has three moments:(Hegel 1967, pp. 163-166) (1) It is a collection of properties in a universal medium. Each of these properties are distinct and determinate. They have this determinateness in virtue of their negation of the other properties. Each is what it is in virtue of its not being the others. These properties interpenetrate, but yet they are independent and do not affect each other. Hegel calls this moment the Also. (2) The thing is also a unified particular with properties which exclude their opposites from this unity, as, for example, the whiteness of a piece of salt excludes its blackness. This moment Hegel calls the One. (3) The thing is also the properties themselves, the relation between these two other moments.

Perceptual consciousness, on this model, has merely to take this object, to do nothing but apprehend what comes its way, in order to have knowledge. It is pure passive receptivity.(Hegel 1967, p. 166) Any action on the part of consciousness would alter the truth. Perceptual consciousness may at times fail to apprehend the object correctly because of this. In these cases any contradiction is attributed to the perception. (This, of course, is a central thesis of perspectivist models of objectivity.) The object is always selfsame. The criterion of truth on this model is selfsameness, and truth is attained by apprehending the object as selfsame.(Hegel 1967, p. 167) After setting forth this model, Hegel then follows his normal procedure of checking to see if the actual experience of perceptual consciousness follows this model.

Perceptual consciousness finds, upon reflection, that its conception of the object is self-contradictory. The properties of the object are seen as both universal and determinate. Perceptual consciousness is aware of the object as purely one. It is also aware of the properties in it as universal.(Hegel 1967, p. 167)As universal, the property belongs to the object as community or Also. But the property is also determinate, excluding its opposites. As determinate the property belongs to the object as One. The particular qualities require attachment to a One in order to be properties. And the property is only determinate in relation to other properties in the universal medium or Also. The particular thing requires properties to characterize it, and the properties require particular things in order to be properties.(Hegel 1967, p. 168) Perceptual consciousness finds itself tossed back and forth; first it considers the object as a One then it is driven to consider it as an Also. Perceptual Consciousness has found that its conception of the object is self-contradictory in that the two moments of the object, the Also and the One, necessarily require each other and, yet, consciousness cannot form both of them into a static conception of the object; one straightaway gives way to the other. This is the first stage of the argument.

Consciousness, however, does not attribute this contradiction to the object, but attributes it to itself. Since it is aware of its own effects, it attempts to strip the distortion introduced by its own workings to get to the object as it is in itself.(Hegel 1967, pp. 168-169) Perceptual consciousness begins by regarding the object as a One, as a particular. It then attributes the manifold of properties to its own workings. The thing is a particular substance or substratum which only has manifold properties in affecting our diverse sensibilities.(Hegel 1967, pp. 169-170)

These manifold properties, however, are determinate, and as we saw in the first stage of the argument, these properties require a One. The thing as One without properties does not exclude others from itself. As we saw, The particular One requires properties. The thing, therefore takes on the characteristics of the universal medium. It has a manifold of independent, interpenetrating properties, and these properties are inherent in the thing itself; they are not due to consciousness.(Hegel 1967, p. 170) The thing becomes an Also, a bundle of atomistic properties. Any unity or particularity we perceive is now due to the workings of consciousness.(Hegel 1967, p. 171)

Consciousness is able to look back upon these last steps and realize that the thing itself, and not just its way of perceiving it, manifests itself in this twofold movement. The thing is a One for itself and an Also for another. The thing is seen to be a movement between these two moments, a movement between being for itself and being for another. (Hegel 1967, p. 172)

The thing is seen to have an essential reality for another as well as for itself. The thing is no longer indifferent as to whether it is known or not, and the representation can no longer be or not be with thing remaining the same. Perceptual consciousness has given way to the Understanding. The thing has become a movement between being for itself, the One, and being for another, the Also. It has become what Hegel calls unconditioned absolute universality. (Hegel 1967, p. 175)

So then, we have seen that Hegel, in the first two chapters of the Phenomenology, gives an account of consciousness's self-critique of a model of how representations function in knowledge. On this model knowledge is seen as a relation between a representation and an object. Representations are seen as sense impressions or perceptions that have no intrinsic connection to their objects. The representation is independent of the character and the existence of the object. Three main argument structures were used in this critique: In the first, Consciousness comes to see that unmediated knowledge is impossible. The simple impression of a representation onto the mind in sensation does not itself make the sensation intrinsically represent a determinate object. In the second, it comes to see that the conception of the object as a thing with many properties is self-contradictory. The objects is seen as represented by the collection of properties as perceived and as the substrate that stands behind these properties. In the third, it comes to see that the object must be seen as the causal locus that stands behind the various properties that we represent the object as having for us.

In the next section, these arguments are put in a contemporary context, and it is made clear how they constitute a critique of the physical-visual model of representation and how they suggest an alternative model.

7.2: Hegel's Insight

In this section I will look at the interpretation given of the preceding arguments by Charles Taylor. Taylor puts the arguments in a modern context, and, by taking them out of their Hegelian language, makes them a more straightforward critique of the physical-visual model of representation.

Taylor introduces two main notions in order to facilitate the understanding of these arguments. The first of these is called the Metacritical move (Taylor 1983), by which these arguments criticize the physical-visual model of representation (PVMR). In this move one sympathetically takes up the PVMR and tries to make it work. That is, they try to represent according to this model. By taking the model seriously, one sees that it can't work as the model for all representation. This is what goes on in the arguments in the previous section; consciousness tried to represent according to the model and found that it could not.

Secondly, Taylor looks at these arguments as transcendental arguments. (Taylor 1972, p. 159) A transcendental argument starts with some undeniable fact of our experience and goes on to argue that experience must have certain features in order for this fact to be as it certainly is. The three arguments from the preceding section are seen as a series of transcendental arguments, each building upon the conclusion of the other.

Taylor interprets Hegel's critique of PVMR using these notions as follows: Hegel had made the Metacritical move in having natural consciousness take up the model of representation that he wished to critique. (Taylor 1972, p. 159) Consciousness will try to represent according to the model, and if it cannot, it will alter the model in ways suggested by the difficulties encountered. The first model encountered is that of sense certainty, where the representation is formed by the pure unmediated receptivity of the object in experience. To represent according to this model we must attempt to form representations from experience which is devoid of any conceptualization. The starting point of the first transcendental argument is that all knowledge must be linguistically expressible, i.e. representable. (Taylor 1972, p. 162) Since knowledge must have this characteristic in order to be knowledge, there can be no unmediated knowledge of particulars. Expression of such knowledge automatically brings it under a description or universal.

The representation of the object formed by unmediated passive sensation can have no content; it can only point to its object. To have content the representation would have to include a description of the object and bring it under concepts, in which case the representation would no longer be unmediated. But even such a bare demonstrative representation is universal and can determine no definite reference, for the domain that is pointed to must be defined in some way and this can only be done by bringing it under concepts. The attempt to get representations from pure passive reception, and thereby have particular definite reference, finds itself to be impossible. What the model is left with is simply a particular which can be only pointed at and many universal descriptions of it.

This is the model with which the next stage begins. Here the representation is formed in the passive apprehension of the object which is here a thing with properties. The dual starting points for the second transcendental argument are that the identification of properties requires that they be seen as belonging to particular things, and that the distinction between particular things requires that they have properties. Therefore, things and properties cannot be separated in consciousness. (Taylor 1972, p. 183) Both the thing and its properties must be an object of perception. It is necessary to our experience of either the properties or the thing that the other be present in experience. The attempt to represent the object through a passive reception of its properties fails, because our representation of the properties requires that we attribute them to an object beyond the properties we represent.

The thing and its properties as an object of experience is the model on which the next argument operates. It argues that if the thing and its properties are to be part of the same experience, then the thing must be grasped as the causal locus of the properties. (Taylor 1972, p. 174) In Hegelian terms, if the One and the Also are both necessarily presented to consciousness as the nature of the object, as they are after stage one of the argument, then the object must be seen as an oscillation, or force, or causal locus which accounts for the appearance of both the particular and the universal medium in consciousness. In more simple language, we couldn't have experiences of objects with diverse properties, such as softness and redness, unless we perceived such objects as a causal locus in this way. Representation requires the connection of properties that arise from interaction with an object as all springing from the object as the common causal locus of these properties. This makes my representation of the object dependent on my interacting with it. If a thing is to be perceived as both a particular thing and a collection of properties, which it must be according to the second argument, then it is essential to my representation or perception of it that I interact with it. It is essential that it be for me as well as for itself. (Taylor 1972, pp. 174-182)

The critique of the PVMR essentially amounts to this: representation was found to be impossible on the models examined in the first two chapters of the Phenomenology. Representation was found to require interaction with the object. The object had to be for me as well as for itself in order for me to know it. That is, representation requires causal interaction with the object in which we represent it in terms of its causal effects on us.

Hegel's argument exploits a property that representations have when taken to be static entities that are separated from any essential interaction with their object. Such representations are indeterminate in their reference. They cannot in virtue of their intrinsic similarity to the object determine their own relation to it. Therefore, they can represent indiscriminately a number of different objects. But these representations must have a determinate correspondence to a single object or type of objects. A single representation cannot correspond to two different objects. Hegel exploits this incoherence within the physical-visual model of representation. This same characteristic of representations when seen in this way also causes problems in the philosophy of language, where linguistic symbols are seen as the representations that must have a determinate correspondence to the world. In the remaining sections, I consider these problems and how, according to Hegel's insight, they lead to a view of representation similar to the one presented in Part Two.

7.3: Indexicals

There are a number of linguistic expressions that represent different things depending on the situation in which the expression is used. Examples of this type of expression are indexicals like 'I', `here', and 'now'. These expressions will represent different things when employed in different situations.

This is a strange and unexpected phenomenon according to the physical-visual model of representation, in which objects represent on their own, in virtue of a similarity to the object. Yet, in the case of indexicals, the same representation, without changing, represents different objects in different contexts. It cannot be similar to all of the different objects which the indexical can represent in different situations.

Nor can the indexical be viewed as a single word with many meanings, for there is no non-indexical representation which can be taken as the meaning of the indexical in any of its particular applications. John Perry has devised an example that shows this: (Perry 1979) Perry is walking through a supermarket; he notices a trail of sugar running down the aisle. He surmises that someone has a leaky bag of sugar and is making a mess. Perry follows the trail of sugar to try to find the person who is making a mess. After numerous circuits around the store he realizes that it is he who is making the mess. He fixes the bag of sugar.

The problem is to find a representation that does not involve an indexical which Perry came to grasp when he fixed the sugar. Perry argues that it is impossible to find such a representation. Any candidate for such a representation such as "John Perry is making a mess" or "The person going in circles around aisle number eight is making a mess" would not explain Perry's action unless he also grasped representations that he would express as "I am J. Perry" or "I am the one going around in circles" If, for example, I were to come to grasp the first two representations without grasping the last two, I would not act to fix my bag of sugar; it's Perry that has the problem, not me. So it seems that indexicals cannot be taken as equivalent to some set of non-indexical representations.[2]

In indexicals it seems that we have a hopelessly indeterminate representation. This element of indeterminacy is not limited to explicit indexicals. Almost all linguistic representation has an indexical element. Language refers to different things when employed under different conditions. An example of this is the dependence of most factual statements on the time of their utterance for their truth value. A sentence that is true now, may not be five minutes from now. There is no set of timeless entities to which representations correspond. Objects change with time, and the stage of the objects' development that a linguistic representation refers to is not determined by any intrinsic property of the representation. The same representation will refer to different objects at different times. 'The president of the U.S.' refers now to a different object than it did in 1973. It seems that indexicality is ubiquitous in language.

While this is a problem for a view in which objects are supposed to represent in virtue of their own properties, it is exactly what one would expect on the view presented here.

On this view, physical objects and events that act as signs do not represent the world. When we use them in communication or for the storage of information, we do so not in virtue of their ability to represent the world on their own. They have no such ability. We do so in virtue of the connections that these symbols have, through nature or convention, to our concepts. It is by activating our concepts and causing us to represent the world according to those concepts that symbols function in communication and information storage. They do not represent the world themselves, they get us to represent it in a way similar to the way the person who made the symbols represented it.

On this view, we would expect the symbols to be indexical. They activate concepts which are not themselves representations, but dispositions to represent in certain ways. Determinate representation only occurs when the concepts are applied in a particular situation. The same concepts applied in different situations result in different acts of representing. Language is indexical, because it doesn't represent the world; it gets us to do it, and how we do it depends on the situation were are in.

7.4: De re and de dicto Knowledge

A central problem in the philosophy of language is referential opacity or the intensionality of relations such as belief and knowledge. The problem is that in statements of belief or knowledge such as, "John believes that Mary is keen." one cannot substitute expressions that have the same reference for expressions in the proposition that is believed and still be sure that the expression will have the same truth value. For example, say Mary is identical to the person who took the last beer from the refrigerator. One cannot substitute 'the person who took the last beer' for 'Mary' in the above expression, for John may also believe that the person who took the last beer is a jerk. This, of course, is possible because John may not know that Mary is the person who took the last beer.

This problem is what led Frege to distinguish between sense and reference, to hold in essence that there are two types of representation. Russell made this more explicit with his distinction between knowledge by aquaintance and knowledge by description. In knowledge by aquaintance, which is essentially equivalent to de re knowledge or knowledge of the object, the representation is connected up to the object through direct contact with the object, not through the correspondence of the representation to the object. In cases of de re knowledge it is not possible that you would be unable to identify the object which you are representing, as would be the case if you only knew the object through a description, such as 'the person who took the last beer'.

This last expression would be knowledge by description, de dicto knowledge or knowledge of a representation of the object. In such cases we are often unable to recognize or refer to the object that we are representing.

The fact that there seem to be these two types of knowledge raises two problems neither of which should arise on the physical-visual model of representation. First, it is unclear how there could be anything like de re knowledge according to this model. Reference is supposed to be established through correctness of representation, so it is unclear how contact with an object will establish a connection between the representation and the object that isn't dependent on the correspondence between the representation and the object. According to the PVMR, representation is a matter of the correspondence or similarity of the representation to its object.

Second, it is unclear how there could be any merely de dicto knowledge according to the PVMR. The connection between representations and objects is determined by a correspondence between them. If a representation is true and has such a correspondence, it is unclear how it can fail to determine reference to that object. It has the only connection to an object that one can have according to the PVMR.

The problem that de re and de dicto knowledge present for the PVMR is of a different nature than that presented by indexicals. The problem is caused by the same characteristic of the PVMR, an indeterminacy of representation that makes de dicto knowledge incapable of determining reference. But the problem is of a different nature.

In the case of indexicals, the problem was caused by the PVMR. The problem lay in the model of representation not in our actual ability to use indexicals to represent determinately. The opposite is the case here. The distinction between de re and de dicto knowledge points out a real deficiency in knowledge by representation. The problem for the PVMR is that according to it, there should be no problem. If a representation corresponds to its object, then it should refer determinately to it.

Let me give some examples that show how this distinction points out a real deficiency in the way we have knowledge and then explain how this problem could be expected according to the model of representation in Part Two.

My office is on the third floor. In climbing the stairs to my office, I sometimes mistakenly get off on the second floor and wander around for a short time until I realize my mistake. Once as I was walking up the stairs to my office I was relating just these facts to a friend, and as I was explaining how I sometimes did such stupid things I got off on the second floor and looked around bewildered as I explained how I sometimes made this very mistake. It seems a serious deficiency in our knowledge that we can be in the process of enunciating a representation of a situation we wish to avoid and at that same moment fail to be aware that that representation refers to the very situation into which we are entering.

If only for the entertainment value, let us consider another example. I had been writing down a list of references when I was interrupted. I put aside the list, and when the interruption was over, I started taking some notes on another project. A little while later, I tried to find the list of references again. After a systematic search of the desk and its surroundings I was just beginning to entertain hypotheses concerning the vanishing of objects into other dimensions, when I discovered that the list of references was right in front of me on the back side of the notes which I had been taking. I had used the same sheet of paper for both. Again it seems a serious deficiency in our knowledge that I should have a true representation of the list of references and even an ability to refer to the object apart from the correctness of my representation (I had looked first in the same spatial region in which I had left the list, but upon seeing that the only thing there was my notes on the other project, I continued my search elsewhere) and yet be unable to recognize the object when all my efforts and abilities are directed towards doing so.[3]

Such deficiencies in the way in which we know by representing are tragic in some instances (Oedipus fails to recognize both his father and his mother though he had true representations of both and it was of greatest importance to him to do so.) and comic in other instances (mistaken identities abound in Shakespeare's comedies), but this deficiency in knowledge by representation is taken as definitive of the human condition in both cases.

While such a condition is inexplicable on the PVMR, it is to be expected on the view presented here. Reference is established independently of correctness of representation and is accomplished by a different set of dispositions than those that are responsible for the content of the representation. It is to be expected that these two sets of dispositions should sometimes fail to be connected so that the knowledge contained in the connections that one set of dispositions tends to make will not be applied to the domains to which the other set of dispositions tends to make us refer. The very fact that allows us to learn from experience and gain knowledge, the independence of reference from correctness of representation, sometimes makes it impossible to apply our knowledge when we most need to.

7.5: Literal Meaning and Figurative Language

John Searle gives an argument (Searle 1979, Chapter Five), very similar to the one considered in the section on indexicals, that language does not have a determinate literal meaning unless situated in a context in which a network of beliefs and background conditions allow it to determine definite conditions of satisfaction. Searle says:

I want to challenge... the view that for every sentence the literal meaning of the sentence can be construed as the meaning it has independently of any context whatever. I shall argue that in general the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions .... (Searle 1979, p. 117)

His argument exploits the fact that, as we saw in section 7.3, all language is indexical in that it requires situation in a context in order to determinately represent a state of affairs.

Searle uses a number of simple examples to show this. One example will suffice here to get the point across, since the principle involved is identical to that in the argument concerning indexicals. Searle argues that the prototypical example of literal meaning 'The cat is on the mat' does not have determinate conditions of satisfaction unless situated in a context of background beliefs and abilities. Searle points out that statements such as this presuppose a gravitational field or an up-down orientation in order to determine conditions of satisfaction. He also points out that there will always be borderline cases, such as if the cat is half on and half off the mat, in which it will be unclear if the conditions of satisfaction are met.

While it is impossible to see how language could be figurative according to the physical-visual model of representation, it is hard to see how it could be any other way according to the model in Part Two. Since language does not itself represent the world but only activates concepts which tend towards representing the world in certain ways, what a piece of language represents and whether it is true or not will depend upon the particular context in which it is applied. Only acts of representing are determinate on this view. Thus, language will be figurative, i.e. it will give rise to different acts of representing and, hence, have different meanings, in different situations. This is because our concepts produce different acts of representing when applied in different contexts. Application of language to new domains will produce new meanings.

Also, because language can be connected to more than one set of concepts, it can direct an interpreter to represent the world in a number of different ways. In the hands of an artist who can exploit the various connections that our symbols have to our concepts, language can become a powerful tool in getting us to look at the world in novel and unexpected ways. The power of language is due to its indefinite connection to concepts, not to an ability to represent apart from our interpretation in particular contexts.

7.6: Putnam's Model Theoretic Argument

Putnam's model theoretic argument can be seen as an extension of Searle's argument to linguistic and representational systems. It argues that even an entire linguistic system taken as a whole cannot determinately refer by itself. It shows once more that the attempt to make representations come alive will be a failure, even if the the representation is as complex and comprehensive as an entire linguistic symbol system.

Putnam's argument is just another instance of Hegel's insight that representation involves interaction with an object in which different ways of presenting the object are connected and attributed to the object as their causal locus. It should be no surprise, then, that a formal system, a collection of meaningless symbols and rules for combining and manipulating them, should be unable to uniquely determine its own reference. What seems surprising, however, is that model theory, the most powerful tool at the disposal of the attempt to make linguistic representations come alive, should bring about the demise of the attempt. But, again, even this should not surprise one after seeing the structure of Hegel's argument. Hegel's metacritical move was to attempt to represent according to the physical visual model; it will be found that it is impossible to do so according to the presuppositions contained in the model itself. In the same way, the attempt to make linguistic representations come alive in virtue of their formal structure is seen to be impossible because of properties of that very formal structure. We now need to look at Putnam's argument and see why this is so.

Putnam appropriates the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem from model theory and extends it to representational systems that include empirical representations. Model theory provides interpretations for formal systems. That is, it provides assignments of individuals, sets, functions, and relations to the various symbols in a formal system. If such an interpretation makes all the well formed formulas in a system of symbols true, then that interpretation is called a model. Thus truth functional semantics, or the attempt to spell out the meaning of linguistic items by assigning them an extension that preserves the truth of the sentences containing each item is sometimes called model theoretic semantics. It attempts to spell out the meaning of a linguistic system by spelling out a model for it, that is, by defining an interpretation of it that makes all its statements turn out true.

Putnam's argument is aimed most forcefully, then, at model theoretic semantics, although it has much wider application. It shows that fixing the truth value of a statement in all possible worlds does not fix the reference of the linguistic items that make up the statement. But such an argument would have much wider implications than just the downfall of model theoretic semantics. It would show, in a forceful way, that reference is not determined by truth. That is, it would show that reference is not determined by correctness of representation, by the intrinsic similarity of the representation to its object. It shows that representation is not just similarity, because similarity cannot even determine reference. Even truth cannot bridge the gap between representations and the world and determine a unique relationship between the representation and its intended object. Such an argument would show that representations cannot come alive through their own properties.

The intuitive idea behind Putnam's argument is quite simple. Even if we know that a statement is true we do not know what it is true of. The standard example here is Quine's gavagai example.[4] An anthropologist encountering a culture with an unknown language sees a rabbit go by, upon which a native utters "gavagai". The natives repeat this when ever they see a rabbit, and they assent whenever the anthropologist says "gavagai" in the presence of a rabbit. The anthropologist is pretty sure that "gavagai" is true of the situations in which rabbits are present. Yet they are not exactly sure what it is true of. Should it be translated by "There is a rabbit.", "There is an undetached rabbit part.", "There is a rabbit event.", or "There is the rabbit god."? The point here is that an uninterpreted piece of language cannot determine reference; that is, language seen as a set of meaningless symbols cannot determine its own reference even if it is in some truth or similarity relationship to the world.

The Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem is the expression of this fact for formal systems. It holds that any formal system that has a model, i.e. any satisfiable system, has a countable (finite or equinumerous with the set of natural numbers[5]) model. This was a quite surprising result, since it showed that even systems in which you could prove Cantor's Theorem, which stated the existence of transfinite numbers, had countable models. It showed that there would always be unintended models of any formal system. The formal constraints imposed by the system do not uniquely determine its interpretation. Different interpretations will make the same system true; that is, it will have numerous models. In fact, there is a stronger version of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem which requires the Axiom of Choice for its proof that states that every system that has an infinite model has another model which is a subset of the first, so it is easy to see how the number of unintended models could multiply quite quickly.

Putnam shows that this not only true for the formal systems in number and set theory, but even for a system which incorporated all of our empirical knowledge. This shows that our linguistic representation of the world, even if true, does not determine a definite reference or correspondence relationship to the world. Various different models or ontologies could satisfy the theoretical and operational constraints imposed by our system of knowledge. The theoretical constraints are those imposed by the formal structure of the system. Any model must make all the theorems, or logical truths, of the system true. The operational constraints are the constraints imposed by the inclusion of our empirical knowledge of the world in the system . This is expressed in the system by a set of sentences stating the quantity of all physical magnitudes (mass, heat, electrical charge, gravitational force, etc.) at all space-time points to some arbitrary accuracy. (Putnam 1977, p. 3) Thus, Putnam shows that even a representational system that includes all possible operational constraints, all possible empirical knowledge about the world, would not establish reference to a world beyond our representations. He does this by applying the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem to a formalization of an ideal empirical theory. Even such a theory would admit of different alternative interpretations that satisfied all the theoretical and operational constraints.

Putnam shows this by devising a method for constructing unintended interpretations that satisfy all the constraints from the intended model. He does this in Reason, Truth and History (Putnam 1981), giving a technical exposition of the general procedure in an appendix (pp. 217-218) and an example of the method in Chapter Two (pp. 33-35).[6] Rather than go through Putnam's example, which requires a bit of work to understand, I will give a simpler example that illustrates the same feature of representational systems that allows Putnam's argument to work. I will then explain why Putnam's example had to be more complex and how it differs from the one given.

Consider a very simple formal system. Let it contain only two constants, a and b, two predicate symbols, P₁ and P₂, and one relation symbol, R. It has no quantifiers, no variables, and no sentential connectives. The operational constraints in the system are exhausted by the only three sentences in the system. We can imagine that the world which it describes existed only for one instant, and the only empirical knowledge possible would be of two objects, their predicates, and their relation at that instant. Let the operational constraints and the sentences of the system , then, be exhausted by: P₁a, P₂b, and aRb.

One model for this system would be one that assigned the symbols meanings in a world that consisted of only a circle and a square and in which, at the only instant at which the world existed, the circle was on top of the square. This model would be formally defined in this way:

Circle on Square World:

a- the circular object; call it x.

b- the square object; call it y

P₁- circularity, formally defined as {x}.

P₂- squareness, formally defined as {y}.

R- on top of, defined as the set of ordered pairs {<x,y>}

This interpretation makes our simple system true. It satisfies all theoretical and operational constraints imposed by the system; hence it is a model of that system.

But there is another model of the system as well. (in fact, there are indefinitely many.) Consider a world which consists of two dogs, a german shepard and a beagle. At the one instant at which the world is existing, the german shepard is eating the beagle. A model which mapped our system into this world would be defined in this way:

Dog Eat Dog World:

a- a german shepard; call it x.

b- a beagle; call it y.

P₁- german shepardness, defined as {x}.

P₂- beagleness, defined as {y}.

R- is eating, defined as {<x,y>}.

Each of these models maps the system onto a set of objects, properties, and relationships that satisfy the system; they make the three sentences of the system true. What this shows is that when a set of objects or symbols is taken as a representational system the relationship between the symbols and the objects they are meant to represent is wholly arbitrary. A representational system can be used to represent one set of objects just as easily as another as long as both sets have the same formal structure as the set of objects that is taken to be the symbol system. They need only have an isomorphism to the symbol system that allows them to be mapped onto the system in a one to one correspondence.[7] Any interpretation that mapped the above system onto a world with two objects each with one property and with one relation between them would be a model of the system no matter what the objects, properties, or relation were.

Even when sentences expressing operational constraints are included in the system it still cannot uniquely determine a model, because the sentences that express the operational constraints are themselves meaningless strings of symbols that can be interpreted by any isomorphic set of objects, properties, and relations.

Putnam gives a general argument exploiting the property of symbols systems shown above and expressed in the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem to show that any symbol system, no matter how much information it contains, will admit different interpretations. (Putnam 1981, pp. 217-218) The example that he gives (Putnam 1981, pp. 33-34) to exemplify the general procedure used in this proof works exactly the same way as the example above does. His example is considerably more complex because of an extra constraint that he adds to his argument.

In the example above the two interpretations map the system onto different worlds, different sets of objects. Putnam, however, is interested in showing that the Lowenheim-Skolem results hold even if we limit the interpretations to a single domain. This would show that even if there is a single world with a determinate set of objects, no representational system could determinately refer to any subset of the world. So Putnam's example is of two different interpretations of a sentence that map the symbols onto the same domain of objects. Putnam succeeds in getting interpretations that differ, yet which make the same set of operational constraints true by giving disjunctive definitions of the symbols that allow them to be mapped onto one subset of objects in one situation and onto another subset of objects in other situations.

In this way a symbol can satisfy the same operational constraint (by being mapped onto the same objects) as an intended interpretation in situations where the operational constraint is operative, while at the same time being a different interpretation (in virtue of mapping the symbol onto other objects in other situations).[8] Even with this added complexity, Putnam`s example is still just an example of the fact that a symbol system does not determine its own interpretation; it supplies only the most meager of formal constraints upon its interpretation, and these constraints allow multiple incompatible interpretations.

The results of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, then, were inevitable once we began to get precise about how exactly the formal structure of symbolic systems constrains their interpretation. Formal systems are sets of meaningless symbols and can be interpreted as applying to any domain onto which they can be isomorphically mapped. Putnam's use of these results shows that the attempt to make language the representation which can come alive and to see all cognitive representation as linguistic will be a failure in the same way that the attempt to make ideas represent in virtue of their phenomenological character or causal origin was a failure.[9] Putnam's argument is a specific instance, applying to linguistic systems, of Hegel's argument that representations cannot be seen as self-existing objects that determine their relation to their object themselves. They must be seen as one moment or aspect of a process of interaction with an object. Hegel showed that the physical-visual model of representation, the attempt to see representations as objects existing independently of what they represent and yet as determinately referring by themselves, is incoherent. Putnam shows the same thing for the special case of linguistic representation.

Hegel, however, follows the argument in one direction (at least for a little while), and Putnam follows it in another direction. Hegel sees the argument as leading towards a model of representation as a moment in a dialectic interaction with the world, one in which representations can still be seen as representing something outside themselves. He still has a Representational Model of Epistemology.

Putnam takes another route out of the problem. He holds that the argument shows that models are assignments within our representational systems, and that, therefore, the domains or worlds into which they map our symbol systems are also constructions within the system. He says:

Models are not lost noumenal waifs looking for someone to name them; they are constructions within our theory itself, and they have names from birth. (Putnam 1977, p.25)

and

For an internalist like myself, the situation is quite different. In an internalist view also, signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of how the signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that is actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of users can correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those users. 'Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the object and the signs are alike internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what. (Putnam 1981, p.52)

and

If, as I maintain, 'objects' themselves are as much made as discovered, as much products of our conceptual invention as of the 'objective' factor in experience, the factor independent of our will, then of course objects intrinsically belong under certain labels; because those labels are the tools we used to construct a version of the world with such objects in the first place. (Putnam 1981, p. 54)

Thus, Putnam solves the problem posed by the model theoretic argument by abandoning the external model of objectivity and the Representational Model of Epistemology. Representations intrinsically refer to objects because they were used in the construction of those objects, the objects being themselves internal to the representational system. Thus objectivity cannot be a matter of our representations being caused by the object, and knowledge cannot be a relation between representations and extra-representational objects.

It seems to me that Putnam's conclusion is a result of failing to see the full power of Hegel's argument. It does not simply show that the physical-visual model of representation will not work if it is made to apply to extra-representational objects, it shows that it does not work, period. Putnam retains the physical-visual model of representation at the price of the external model of objectivity. On Putnam's view representations intrinsically correspond to objects because they were used in the construction of those objects. (We shall see in Chapter Nine that the same arguments he raises against the external physical-visual model of representation can be brought against his internal version.) In order to retain representations that intrinsically refer, Putnam accepts the counter-intuitive conclusions involved in internalism. It is strange that Putnam's conclusions are a result of the retention of the very model of representation that he argues against.

Before we can argue that this is in fact what Putnam does and that there was an alternative model of representation open to him, we need to see more clearly what conclusion Putnam draws from his version of Hegel's argument and the arguments he gives for drawing that conclusion.