Berkeley's Argument and the Perspectivist Fallacy

David Banach

St. Anselm College

 

If you can conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause
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But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for one to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. ... but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them. ... but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do the utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. (George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, I, 22-23.)

 

  I. Introduction: This argument, upon which Berkeley is willing to put so much weight, is often thought to be obviously invalid because it conflates the properties of a concept with those of the thing the concept represents. I will argue that Berkeley's argument does not make this mistake and that the argument, while still fallacious,  is more subtle and powerful than is commonly thought. In  fact, I will argue that it is a form of argument that is common, and often foundational,  in contemporary thinkers such as Rorty and Putnam, a form of argument I will call the Perspectivist Fallacy.

 

 II. The Perspectivist Fallacy:

    A. Weak version: The argument that representations from particular perspectives cannot be true or objective, simply because they are perspectival.

    B. Strong version: The argument that representations from particular perspectives cannot even refer to or be about external objects.  (Berkeley's version)

    C. Common examples:

       1. The Eternal Why: Every representation of reality is just a representation and needs further justification. But every justification is just another representation, which itself needs justification. (Figure 1.)

         a. The five year old version.

         b. Richard Rorty's version.

       2. The Meaning of Life: Every particular action or value can be questioned from some more objective point of view. Every justification of any value is always from some other point of view which itself needs justification. What we do now won't matter 100 years from now, and, even if it did, what matters 100 years from now won't matter from some other point of view. Every value requires external justification. (See Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, Oxford U. Press, 1986.)

       3. "That's Just Your Opinion": There is no right answer, because every possible answer is just somebody's point of view. That's just your opinion. (The implication being that simply because it is an opinion from a particular perspective, it can't be objective or correct.

 

III.  The Perspectivist Fallacy and the Physical Model of Representation.

     A.  The argument is a non sequitur: Most versions of the argument simply do not follow unless one takes for granted a particular view of what representations are and how they represent.

     B.  The Physical Model of Representation: This model views mental and perspectival representation as self-sufficient objects, using the way that physical objects,  such as pictures,  can serve as representations as a paradigm.

        1.  A physical icon, such as a statue, is seen as representing an object in virtue of its similarity to  it.  The role that an interpreter plays, in recognizing the similarity between the icon and the object and projecting the known properties of the object onto the icon, are overlooked.

            (Figure 2)

        2.  This incompletely analyzed example is used as the model for mental representation.  In mental representation, however, there is no question of an interpreter seeing both the object and the representation, noting their similarities, and projecting the properties of one onto the other. It is held that we have accesss only to the mental representation. (Figure 3)

 

 IV.  Berkeley's Argument.

      A.  The standard interpretation: 

 

1. Assume material objects exist, and try to conceive one existing without being conceived in some thinkers mind.
2. In attempting to conceive a material object existing unconceived, you are attempting to conceive something that is unconceived. This is a manifest absurdity.
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By RAA, material objects don't exist.

 

     B.  The standard  criticism: This makes the obvious confusion between the properties of a concept and the properties of what it refers to. In conceiving a mountain, I don't have rocks in my head. Hence, in conceiving something unconceived, my concept is not unconceived, what it refers to is. The contradiction disappears.

     C.  A new interpretation:

 

1. Things represent (refer) in virtue of a similarity to their object.
2. Nothing can be like an idea, but an idea.
3. A material object, by definition, is unlike an idea.
4. Hence, a concept of a material object is a representation similar to something it is not similar to. This is a manifest absurdity.
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We do not and cannot refer to external objects.

Hence, the things we talk about and refer to (trees, rocks, etc.) cannot be external material objects.

 

     D.  Putnam's version: This is similar to Berkeley's argument, but the obstacle to reference is no longer similarity, but the lack of independent access to extra-mental objects.

 

  V. The Incoherence of the Perspectivist models of representation and objectivity:

     A. Representation: The strong version of the Perspectivist Fallacy shows that if representations are taken as mental or linguistic objects that have no intrinsic relation to the object they are supposed to represent or refer to, and if perspectives are seen to be views of representations not interactions with or relations to external objects, then representation or reference will be impossible. That is, representations will not function as representations. The Perspectivist Fallacy  assumes  a model of representation that views the act of representing as a reified object and, hence, makes reference and representation impossible.  It then goes on to argue that reference to extra-mental objects is impossible. The conclusion is not surprising, since the view of representation upon which the argument is based is self-defeating.

    B.  Objectivity: Objectivity requires that the representation reflect the object and not the perspective from which the representation arises. But since a perspective is seen as a view of the representation only and not a relation to the object, every perspectival representation can reflect or represent only another representation or perspective, not reality itself. The attempt to justify our representations only results in more representations. (The Amazing Perspectivist Platform.)

 

 VI.  Conclusion: The Perspectivist fallacy ignores the possibility that representation is an act, not a property of a physical object in isolation from a representer.  If representing is an act in which we directly interact with the world, particular perspectives must not only become bearers of knowledge, but the foundations of all knowledge. Perspectives are not windowless rooms from which there is no escape. They are themselves windows on the world. They give a limited and incomplete view of the world, but a view none the less.