David Banach
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I - MODELS OF REPRESENTATION
CHAPTER I - MODELS OF REPRESENTATION AND
OBJECTIVITY.
1.1 - The Physical-Visual Model of Representation.
1.2 - Models of Objectivity
1.3 - The Elements of an Alternative Model of Representation
CHAPTER II - HISTORICAL MANIFESTATIONS
CHAPTER III - THE CASE AGAINST THE REPRESENTATIONAL
MODEL OF EPISTEMOLOGY
PART II - AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
CHAPTER IV - REFERENCE
4.1 - Representing without Similarity
4.2 - Reference apart from Correctness. The Intuitive Case
4.3 - Representing and Referring
4.4 - Putnam contra a Putnamian Theory of Reference
CHAPTER V - CONCEPTS
5.1 - Why do Concepts Present such a Problem?
5.2 - What are Concepts?
5.3 - How Concepts Work
5.4 - Why Concepts aren't Representations
CHAPTER VI - AGENCY, OBJECTIVITY, AND TRUTH
6.1 - Agency
6.2 - Objectivity
6.3 - Truth
PART III - THE ALTERNATIVE DEFENDED
CHAPTER VII - HEGEL'S INSIGHT AND FOUR PROBLEMS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
7.1 - The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology
7.2 - Hegel's Insight
7.3 - Indexicals
7.4 - De re and de dicto Knowledge
7.5 - Literal Meaning and Figurative Language
7.6 - Putnam's Model Theoretic Argument
CHAPTER VIII - PUTNAM
8.1 - Metaphysical Realism
8.2 - Putnam's Arguments
8.3 - Internal Realism
CHAPTER IX - REPRESENTATION AND REALISM
9.1 - Putnam and the Perspectivist Fallacy.
9.2 - Representation, Truth, and Generality
9.3 - Properties and Objects
9.4 - Inadequacies of Internalism
9.5 - The Objectivity of the Self and the Motivation of Realism